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Bentham’s Binary Form of Maximizing Utilitarianism
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
Jeremy Bentham is oen interpreted as defending a satiscing, rather thanmax-
imizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces
more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Ben-
tham’smaximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against
the satiscing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a max-
imizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to
those of not performing the act. I show that following this version of utilitarian-
ism requires that one realizes the greatest happiness for all aected individuals.
A puzzling feature of Jeremy Bentham’s statement of utilitarianism is its apparent
lack of maximization. This is puzzling because, as is well-known, Bentham
popularized themaximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’
and he coined the terms ‘maximize’ and ‘maximization’.1 Marcus G. Singer, for
example, writes:
There is no hint [in Bentham’s statement of utilitarianism] that one ought,
or is obligated, to do that act which, of all the available alternatives, would
produce the absolutely best consequences. (Singer, 1977, p. 68)
Singer (1977, pp. 67–8) and Anthony Quinton (1973, pp. 2–3) both argue that
Bentham defends a satiscing criterion of rightness, rather than a maximizing
one.2Others, such asMichael Slote [p. 88] (1984, pp. 153–4) andGerald J. Postema
∗ I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent to me at
johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 Bentham (1977, p. 393) popularized the slogan but was not the rst to use it; see footnote 32.
For his rst use of ‘maximize’ and ‘maximization’, see OED2, vol. 9, p. 497.
2 Rosen (2003, pp. 226–7) does not accept the satiscing interpretation but takes Bentham’s
talk about maximizing happiness to merely make the distributive point ‘that happiness should be
extended to the greatest possible number of people’. Postema (1998) objects to Rosen’s argument,
yet favours an equality sensitive interpretation based on the following paragraph:
I recognize, as the all-comprehensive, and only right and proper end ofGovernment,
the greatest happiness of the members of the community in question: the greatest
happiness—of all of them, without exception, in so far as possible: the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of them, on every occasion on which the nature
of the case renders the provision of an equal quantity of happiness for every one
of them impossible: it being rendered so, by its being matter of necessity, to make
sacrice of a portion of the happiness of a few, to the greater happiness of the rest.
(Bentham, 1831, p. 7)
This paragraph says, according to Postema (1998, p. 157), that we should aim for an equal distribu-
tion of happiness and that we should only aim for the greatest happiness if an equal distribution
cannot be achieved. The paragraph says, I think, the opposite, namely, that we should aim for the
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(2002, p. xv), interpret Bentham as defending satiscing in An Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation but as defending maximizing elsewhere.
In this paper, I shall argue that Bentham consistently defends maximizing rather
than satiscing but his maximizing has a peculiar, binary form.
We shall see that Bentham’s version of utilitarianism diers structurally in
many ways from the more standard version of utilitarianism presented in G. E.
Moore’s Ethics. According to Moore’s maximizing version of utilitarianism,
A voluntary action is right, whenever and only when no other action
possible to the agent under the circumstances would have caused more
pleasure; in all other cases, it is wrong. (Moore, 1912, p. 31)
Here, on what we can callMoorean maximization, an act is right if and only if it
has at least as good consequences as every act the agent could have performed
instead in the situation. Bentham, I shall argue, does not defend Moorean max-
imization; he defends a version of utilitarianism with a non-standard, binary
form of maximization, where an act is only compared to the negative act of not
doing that act—rather than to every act the agent could have performed instead.
He holds that an act ought to be done if and only if it produces a greater balance
of pleasure over pain than the negative act of not doing that act. As I will explain,
this binary act utilitarianism still requires that, in order to avoid wrongdoing,
one must follow the course of action that would produce the greatest happiness
among all feasible courses of action.3 Hence Bentham does defend a maximizing,
rather than satiscing, version of utilitarianism. [p. 89]
1. The principle of utility and its connection to right and wrong
Why would anyone think that Bentham defends satiscing? To understand this,
we need to explore how rightness in Bentham’s ethics is connected to pain and
pleasure via his principle of utility. In the opening chapter of An Introduction,
Bentham presents the principle as follows:4
(B1) An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of
utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to
the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the
happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.
(Bentham, 1970, pp. 12–13)
greatest happiness even if, in order to realize the greatest happiness, the happiness may sometimes
need to be unequally distributed. The key is the relation between (i) the part starting ‘the greatest
happiness of the greatest. . .’ and (ii) the part starting ‘it being. . .’ Part (ii) claries that the equal
distribution in (i) is ‘impossible’ only in the sense that it cannot be achieved if one is to achieve
the overall greatest happiness. With this in mind, (i) does not say that one should aim for the
greatest happiness if an equal distribution cannot be achieved. Rather (i) claries that the greatest
happiness should be our end even when it rules out an unequal distribution of happiness. This
clarication need not have been obvious to Bentham’s contemporaries, because early utilitarians
typically favoured egalitarian policies.
3 The two approaches will, however, dier at times about the rightness and wrongness of
individual acts as will be explained in Section 8.
4 The numbers prefaced by ‘B’ refer to Bentham quotes.
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The principle of utility is Bentham’s standard of right and wrong. He writes:
(B2) Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one may
always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that
it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it
is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be
done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action.
When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and
others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have
none. (Bentham, 1970, p. 13)
Yet Bentham’s criterion in (B2) is somewhat obscured by an unfortunate use of
disjunctions (which we will return to in Section 5). He presents the principle
of utility and its relation to right and wrong a little bit clearer in Rationale of
Judicial Evidence:
(B3) Inmorals, as in legislation, the principle of utility is that which holds
up to view as the only sources and tests of right and wrong, human
suering and enjoyment—pain and pleasure. It is by experience,
and by that alone, that the tendency of human conduct, in all its
modications, to give birth to pain and pleasure, is brought to view:
it is by reference to experience, and to that standard alone, that
the tendency of any such modications to produce more pleasure
than pain, and consequently to be right, or more pain than pleasure,
and consequently to be wrong, is made known and demonstrated.
(Bentham, 1827, vol. 1, p. 120; 1838–1843, vol. 6, p. 238)
From (B2) and (B3), it seems that Bentham holds the following:
(4) An act is right if it conforms to the principle of utility.
(5) An act is wrong if it deviates from the principle of utility.
This reading is also supported by Bentham’s more general view, put forward in
Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, that [p. 90]
(B6) right is the conformity to a rule, wrong the deviation from it (Ben-
tham, 2010, p. 186)
From (B1), we have that an act conforms to the principle of utility if it augments
the happiness of the community. In (B1), Bentham does not say when an act
deviates from the principle of utility. But (B1), (B3), and (B6) combined suggest
that Bentham holds that an act deviates from the principle of utility if it lessens
the happiness of the community. Here, happiness is simply what is measured by
Bentham’s felicic calculus.5 Understanding the felicic calculus is, I think, the
key to understanding the structure of Bentham’s utilitarianism. In An Introduc-
tion, Bentham provides the following algorithm for this calculus—which, since
it will be crucial for our discussion, is worth quoting in full:6
5 Bentham provides a somewhat ambiguous denition of happiness in (B49).
6 The value of an individual pleasure or pain depends, according to Bentham (1970, p. 38), on
four circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty (i.e. probability), and propinquity. The rst three
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(B7) Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most
immediately to be aected by it: and take an account,
1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which appears
to be produced by it in the rst instance.
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by
it in the rst instance.
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced
by it aer the rst. This constitutes the fecundity of the rst pleasure
and the impurity of the rst pain.
4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by
it aer the rst. This constitutes the fecundity of the rst pain, and
the impurity of the rst pleasure.
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and
those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side
of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole,
with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side
of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose interests
appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect
to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of the degrees of good
tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in
regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon [p. 91] the whole:
do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom
the tendency of it is bad upon the whole. Take the balance; which,
if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the
act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with
respect to the same community. (Bentham, 1970, pp. 39–40 with
corrected text)
The basis of the satiscing interpretation is the following straightforward reading
of the felicic calculus in (B7):7
(8*) An act conforms to the principle of utility if the sum total of the values
of the pleasures it appears to produce is greater than the sum total of the
values of the pains it appears to produce.
(9*) An act deviates from the principle of utility if the sum total of the values of
the pains it appears to produce is greater than the sum total of the values
of the pleasures it appears to produce.
circumstances seems fairly straightforward. Bentham’s (1998, p. 251–2) discussion in Codication
Proposal suggests that we calculate the value of a pain or pleasure x by multiplying these along
with a discounting function, representing propinquity:
value(x) = intensity(x) ∗ duration(x) ∗ probability(x) ∗ e−r t
where t is the number of years into the future the pain or pleasure would occur and r is the discount
rate. Bentham (1998, p. 251) explains propinquity with an example of continuous compounding
with an interest rate at 5 %. Yet Bentham has not told us what the right discount rate is, except
that it is non-zero. The 5 % rate seems to be a merely illustrative example. It was probably picked
because, in 1821 when Bentham wrote that passage, the discount rate of the Bank of England had
been at 5 % for over a hundred years; see Clapham (1944, vol. 1, p. 299).
7 The numbered claims with asterisks are not part of my interpretation of Bentham.
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Accordingly, Quinton, Singer, Slote and Postema take Bentham to hold the
following satiscing version of utilitarianism, combining (8*) and (9*) with (4)
and (5) respectively:8
(10*) An act is right if the sum total of the values of the pleasures it appears to
produce is greater than the sum total of the values of the pains it appears
to produce.
(11*) An act is wrong if the sum total of the values of the pains it appears to
produce is greater than the sum total of the values of the pleasures it
appears to produce.
To see that this is a satiscing version of utilitarianism, consider the following
choice about whether or not to do an act a:
Case 1
Act Pleasures Pains
a 2 1
not-a 3 0
In this table, the ‘Pleasures’ column represents the sum total of the values of
the pleasures the acts appear to produce, and the ‘Pains’ column represents the
sum total of the values of the pains that the acts appear to produce. Even though
a yields less pleasure and more pain than not-a, we still have that a is right
according to (10*).9 And, according to (8*), act a conforms to the principle of
utility, because the balance of pleasures and pains for a is [p. 92] on the side
of pleasures, and thus a has an overall good tendency. Still, not-a has an even
better tendency.
In Case 1, not-a is an example of a negative act, which consists in forbearing
fromdoing a. According to Bentham, such forbearances are also acts. He explains
the distinction between negative and positive acts in An Introduction:
(B12) By positive are meant such as consist in motion or exertion: by
negative, such as consist in keeping at rest; that is, in forbearing to
move or exert one’s self in such and such circumstances. Thus, to
strike is a positive act: not to strike on a certain occasion, a negative
one. Positive acts are styled also of commission; negative, acts of
omission or forbearance.10 (Bentham, 1970, p. 75)
We shall return to the role of negative acts in Bentham’s utilitarianism in Sec-
tion 8.
8Quinton (1973, pp. 2–3), Singer (1977, pp. 67–8), Slote (1984, p. 154) and Postema (2002, p. xv).
9 Shaver (2013, p. 295) similarly points out that, in a case where one can produce one unit of
pleasure or produce a million units of pleasure, (10*) yields that it is right to just produce one
unit. He therefore thinks that the (10*) interpretation attributes an overly silly view to Bentham.
10 In Constitutional Code, Bentham (1838–1843, vol. 9., p. 480) provides the following denition:
a negative act, consisting in abstinence, from the performance of some positive act.
As Bentham (1970, p. 76; 2010, p. 253) points out, whether an act is positive or negative depends
on how it is described: ‘get drunk’/‘not stay sober’ or ‘not get drunk’/‘stay sober’. A negative act is
merely an act described as not doing some act. Every positive act has a ‘correspondent’ negative
act; see (B17).
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2. Prohibition dilemmas and the logic of the will
To seewhy the satiscing interpretation does not add up,we need to get clearer on
Bentham’s views on the logic andmeaning of deontic concepts. Deontic concepts
are, as we shall see, closely linked to commands and prohibitions through their
shared connection to the approval and disapproval of the legislator. This link
allows us to infer parts of Bentham’s deontic logic from his logic of commands,
that is, from his logic of the will. Writing in A Comment on the Commentaries
about the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, Bentham claims that
(B13) Were I to be asked what it is I mean when I call an action a right
one, I should answer very readily: neither more nor less than, an
action I approve of: and so of a wrong action, an action I disapprove
of. (Bentham, 1977, p. 53)
Hence, according to Bentham, rightness and wrongness correspond to approval
and disapproval respectively. Similarly, Bentham (1983, p. 207) claims in Deon-
tology that, like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ correspond to the
approval or disapproval—that is, to the decided will—of the legislator. In the
chapter ‘Aspects of a Law’ of Of the Limits, Bentham explains, in turn, how the
will relates to commands:
(B14) To begin with the case where the will is decided. The wish must
either be that the act should be performed, or that it should not be
performed: in the former case, the mandate is what, in the most
conned sense of [p. 93] the word, is termed a command: in the
latter, a prohibition. The will being undecided, there is no wish,
that can be operative or ecient, to express: all that the mandate
can express is the negation of one or other of the two operative
kinds of mandates: it is accordingly either what may be termed a
non-command, or else a non-prohibition, that is, to use the common
language, a permission. (Bentham, 2010, p. 252)
So an act that is right or ought to be done is an act that is approved of and, in
turn, commanded. And an act that is wrong or ought not to be done is an act
that is prohibited. It might seem strange to treat both acts that are right and acts
that ought to be done as commanded acts.11 But, as we shall see later in (B20),
Bentham regards an act’s being right as equivalent to its being obligatory. Note
also that—in addition to rightness, corresponding to approval, and wrongness,
corresponding to disapproval—the second half of (B14) describes a third deontic
category corresponding to the undecided, indierent will. This third category of
permitted acts that are neither obligatory nor wrong would, in contemporary
usage, be considered to be right acts, but Bentham treats them as an additional,
alternative deontic category. We shall return to the category of indierent acts
in Section 6.
Through this link between deontic terms on the one hand and commands
and prohibitions on the other, we can learn something about Bentham’s views
11 This conicts with Moore’s (1912, p. 36) more standard view, that ‘to say that an action is
right is not to imply that it ought to be done’.
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on deontic logic from the following part of his logic of the will, presented later
in ‘Aspects of a Law’:
(B15) 1. The act may be commanded: it is, then, le unprohibited: and it is
not prohibited, nor le uncommanded. 2. It may be prohibited: it is,
then le uncommanded: and it is not commanded, nor permitted
(that is le unprohibited). 3. It may be le uncommanded: it is, then,
not commanded: but it may be either prohibited or permitted:
yet so as that, if it be in the one case, it is not in the other. 4. It
may be permitted: it, then, is not prohibited: but it may be either
commanded or le uncommanded: yet so as that, if it be in the one
case, it is not in the other.12 (Bentham, 2010, pp. 139–40)
Given the link we found, point 1 in (B15) supports that Bentham holds that
(16) If an act x ought to be done, then x is not wrong.
This reading follows Georg Henrik von Wright (1981, p. 5), who dubbed (16)
‘Bentham’s Law’.
In ‘Aspects of a Law’, Bentham also explains the relation between commands
of negative and positive acts: [p. 94]
(B17) A negative aspect towards a positive act is equipollent to an arma-
tive aspect towards the correspondent negative act. To will during
a given period the act of not carrying arms shall be performed is to
will that throughout that period the continued act or habit of not
carrying arms should be persevered in. It is in this way that a com-
mand may wear the form of a prohibition: and a prohibition that
of a command. The law which prohibits the mother from starving
her child commands her to take care that it be fed. The one may
be at pleasure translated or converted into the other. (Bentham,
2010, pp. 252–3)
In other words, a prohibition of an act translates into a command of the corre-
sponding negative act, and vice versa, which in deontic terms means that
(18) An act x ought to be done if and only if not-x is wrong.
Which entails that
(19) If an act x is wrong, then not-x ought to be done.
This reading is backed up by a passage from The Elements of the Art of Packing,
where Bentham complains about
(B20) propositions, of the cast termed by logicians identical, t only for
mouths and pens of drivellers: propositions, which neither convey-
ing instruction not imposing obligation, leave every thing exactly
as they nd it: propositions declaring that what is right ought to
be done, and what is wrong ought not to be done, and so forth.
(Bentham, 1821, p. 247; 1838–1843, vol. 5, p. 176)
Since Bentham takes it to be logically true that ‘what is wrong ought not to be
done’, he must accept (19).
Consider then a situation with the following available acts:
12 See also Bentham’s (2010, p. 254) almost identical later dra of this passage.
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Case 2
Act Pleasures Pains
a 0 1
not-a 0 2
Since the balance is on the side of pains for both a and not-a, we have that both
a and not-a are wrong according to (11*). Hence prohibition dilemmas, where
all available acts are wrong, would be possible on the satiscing interpretation
of Bentham’s utilitarianism. Regarding cases like Case 2, Quinton claims that
it is possible that all the available alternatives would detract from the
general happiness to some extent. It would seem congruous with the spirit
of the general happiness principle to choose that action which detracts
least from it. But this yields a paradox: as detracting from the general
happiness it ought [p. 95] not to be done, as detracting less than any other
possibility it ought to be done. (Quinton, 1973, p. 3)
While this seems paradoxical, there is a more direct problem for the satiscing
interpretation. According to (11*), act a is wrong. But, if a is wrong, then, by (19),
we have that not-a ought to be done. And, if not-a ought to be done, then, by
(16), we have that not-a is not wrong. Yet, according to (11*), not-a is wrong.
Hence we have a contradiction. Moreover, the result of (11*) in Case 2, that one
is bound to deviate from the principle of utility in that case, does not t with
Bentham’s remark in An Introduction that
(B21) The principle of utility is capable of being consistently pursued; and
it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued,
the better it must ever be for human-kind. (Bentham, 1970, p. 21)
On top of that, (B21) does not t with the implications of (10*) in Case 1. In that
case, (10*) yields that it is right to do a, yet doing a would presumably be worse
rather than better for humankind than doing not-a. Since these problems are
both obvious and serious, it would be too uncharitable to interpret Bentham in
this manner if there is a plausible interpretation that avoids these problems.
3. Forbearing pains and pleasures
There is a further problem for the satiscing interpretation in Case 2. The fol-
lowing two passages strongly suggests that, in Case 2, act a would, according to
Bentham, be right rather than wrong, contradicting (11*). In An Introduction,
Bentham claims that
(B22) 1. The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community;
and therefore, in the rst place, to exclude, as far as may be, every
thing that tends to subtract from that happiness: in other words, to
exclude mischief.
2. But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.
Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it
ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some
greater evil.13 (Bentham, 1970, p. 158)
13 See also Bentham’s (1998, p. 251na) medicine example in Codication Proposal.
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It is hard to make sense of this passage given (10*) and (11*). If the relevant
comparison for whether an act is right or wrong is whether the act produces
more pleasure than pain, it is hard to understand how the fact that an act excludes
some evil—that is, some pain—could be relevant for whether an act is right
or wrong.14 Consider Case 2, which is structured like the examples Bentham
describes in (B22), where the likely eect of act a—which could, for [p. 96]
example, be to take one’s medicine—is mainly that it averts some pain. In Case 2,
(11*) yields that a is wrong even though, if a were performed, only a little pain
would occur rather than the more signicant pain that would occur if not-a
were performed.15
4. Averted pains count as pleasures; averted pleasures count as pains
Bentham’s comments in (B22) on cases like Case 2 make clear that the principle
of utility is supposed to take into account preventions of pain and pleasure.
He also makes this clear in his discussion of motives, where he puts forward a
general account of the tendency of things that are themselves neither pains nor
pleasures. This account depends, among other things, on preventions of pain
and pleasure:
(B23) With respect to goodness and badness, as it is with every thing
else that is not itself either pain or pleasure, so is it with motives. If
they are good or bad, it is only on account of their eects: good, on
account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad,
on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure.
(Bentham, 1970, p. 100)
The felicic calculus purports to calculate the good or bad tendency of acts.
Since acts are not themselves pains or pleasures, their value, according to (B23),
partly depends on avoided pains and pleasures. So the felicic calculus should
also take preventions into account.
That the principle of utility takes preventions of pain and pleasure into
account suggests that there is a comparative, counterfactual element involved in
the principle that is not present in (8*) and (9*). To get clearer on this comparative
14 Hence we need to reject Schoeld’s (2006, p. 40) interpretation that whether an act is right or
wrong is determined by ‘the quantity of pleasure and pain which had been brought into existence
by the action in question.’ Unless, of course, Schoeld follows Bentham’s non-standard usage.
15 One might object that, if Slote and Postema only interpret Bentham as defending satiscing
in An Introduction, it is unfair to rely on textual evidence from other works.
But, rst, note that the logical objection based on (16) and (19) in Case 2 was mainly based
on passages from Of the Limits, which was conceived as a continuation of An Introduction and
written before the printing of An Introduction; see Bentham (2010, p. xi). Hence it seems that
these passages are relevant for an interpretation of An Introduction.
Second, note that (B21) on its own is inconsistent with the satiscing view in Case 2. And, for the
objection about forbearing pains and pleasures, we need only rely on (B22). Finally, (B45) seems
to directly contradict the satiscing view. Yet (B21), (B22), and (B45) are all from An Introduction.
Third, it seems to me that Bentham did not change his fundamental ethical views during his
publishing career. The changes between dierent epochs that Bentham (1983, pp. 326–8) reports
in the short version of ‘Article on Utilitarianism’ seem to mainly concern changes in presentation
rather than any substantial changes to his ethical theory.
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element of the principle of utility, we need to pay attention to what Bentham
thinks should be taken into account when the principle is applied. InDeontology,
he makes clear that, when one applies the principle of utility, one should compare
the balance of the pains and pleasures if the act were done with the balance of
the pains and pleasures if the act were not done: [p. 97]
(B24) On the occasion of any proposed act, to make application of the
principle of utility is to take one account of the feelings of the two
opposite kinds—of the pleasures of all sorts on the one side, of
the pains of all sorts on the other side—which, in all breasts that
seem likely to be in any way aected by it, seem liable and likely, in
the two opposite cases of the act’s being done and of its being le
undone, to take place. (Bentham, 1983, p. 168)
From (B24), it is clear that applying the principle of utility to assess an act involves
comparing what would happen were one to perform that act with what would
happen were one to forbear from performing it. This raises the puzzle of how to
understand the algorithm in (B7), which at rst sight looks like it only takes into
account what would happen if the act in question were performed.
That Bentham simply forgot about preventions when he wrote the algorithm
in (B7) does not seem credible. First, note that the short chapter presenting the
felicic calculus in (B7) starts as follows:
(B25) Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends which the
legislator has in view: it behoves him therefore to understand their
value. (Bentham, 1970, p. 38)
Given this initial emphasis on avoiding pains, it would be strange if the calculus
presented in the same short chapter did not account for the avoidance of pains.
Second, note that in the penultimate paragraph of that chapter, commenting on
the usefulness of the just presented calculus, Bentham states that
(B26) An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable,
on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it
enables a man to produce, and what comes to the same thing the
pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. (Bentham, 1970,
p. 40)
Hence Bentham emphasizes averting pains just before and just aer the felicic
calculus. In light of this, the forgetfulness solution is implausible.
But (B26) provides a further clue to the puzzle: In (B26) and throughout
An Introduction, Bentham stresses that preventions of pains ‘comes to the same
thing’ as pleasures in his theory and, similarly, preventions of pleasures ‘comes
to the same thing’ as pains:
(B27) By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to
produce benet, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in
the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to
the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered (Bentham,
1970, p. 12)
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(B28) Having taken a general view of these two grand objects (viz. plea-
sure, and what comes to the same thing, immunity from pain) in
the character [p. 98] of nal causes; it will be necessary to take a
view of pleasure and pain itself, in the character of ecient causes
or means. (Bentham, 1970, p. 34)
(B29) For danger is nothing but the chance of pain, or, what comes to the
same thing, of loss of pleasure. (Bentham, 1970, p. 144)
This suggests that preventions of pains should be counted as pleasures in the
algorithm for the felicic calculus and, analogously, that preventions of pleasures
should be counted as pains. If we read (B7) with this inmind, the felicic calculus
takes preventions of pain and pleasure into account and makes a lot more sense.
Hence we have a solution to our puzzle.
Thus, to summarize the textual evidence, we have: (i), from Section 3, that
Bentham thinks that one should avoid pain; (ii), from (B24), that he holds that
applying the principle of utility takes in to account both the eects of an act’s
being done and those of its not being done; (iii), from (B23), that he holds that
the tendency of things in general should take preventions into account; (iv),
from (B27)–(B29), that he regards throughout An Introduction that producing
pleasure (pain) comes to the same thing as averting pain (pleasure); and (v)
that he emphasizes the avoidance of pains both in the introduction to felicic
calculus—(B25)—and in the discussion following it—(B26).
In the light of (i)–(v), there is, I think, strong textual evidence that any pains
that appear to be averted by the act should be included with the pleasures that
appear to be produced by it in steps 1 and 3 of the algorithm in (B7) and, similarly,
that any pleasures that appear to be averted by the act should be included with
the pains that appear to be produced by it in steps 2 and 4.16 This provides,
combined with (B1), the following reading of the calculus, where like in the rest
of my interpretations ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ are used in their standard senses that
do not include averted pains and pleasures:17
(30) An act conforms to the principle of utility if the sum total of the values
of the pleasures it appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is
[p. 99] greater than the sum total of the values of the pains it appears to
produce and the pleasures it appears to avert.18
16 If ‘pains’ and ‘pleasures’ are used in Bentham’s inclusive manner in (10*) and (11*), then (10*)
and (11*) become a version of the binary view and hence, by the argument in Section 8, a form of
maximizing rather than satiscing.
17 Regarding Rationale of Judicial Evidence, this reading of ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ is plausible in
(B3) given his (1827, vol. 1, p. 192n; 1838–1843, vol. 6, p. 259n2) claim that
Whatever act aords any the minutest particle of satisfaction, of pleasure, or
removes or prevents any the least particle of pain, is, in so far, good.
See also Bentham’s (1827, vol. 1, p. 185n; 1838–1843, vol. 6, p. 257n1) denitions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
which take preventions of pains or pleasure into account. Hence it seems that (B3) should be read
so that preventions are taken into account, and, given my reading of ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’, it would
be.
18 This way of understanding Bentham’s calculus suggests that he was a total rather than
average utilitarian. In Institute of Political Economy, Bentham (1952–1954, vol. 3, p. 318) makes
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(31) An act deviates from the principle of utility if the sum total of the values
of the pleasures it appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is
less than the sum total of the values of the pains it appears to produce and
the pleasures it appears to avert.
Combining (30) and (31) with (4) and (5) respectively, we get the following
sucient criteria for right and wrong:
(32) An act is right if the sum total of the values of the pleasures it appears to
produce and the pains it appears to avert is greater than the sum total of
the values of the pains it appears to produce and the pleasures it appears
to avert.
(33) An act is wrong if the sum total of the values of the pleasures it appears to
produce and the pains it appears to avert is lesser than the sum total of the
values of the pains it appears to produce and the pleasures it appears to
avert. [p. 100]
5. Bentham’s account of obligation
Having found these sucient criteria for right and wrong, let us return to Ben-
tham’s views on obligation. Commenting on (B2), Quinton questions whether
clear, contrary to what Peter Singer (1976, pp. 81–82) claims, that he was aware of the distinction
between total and average views:
Opulence, though so nearly of kin towealth, or rather for that very reason, requires to
be distinguished from it: opulence is relativewealth, relation being had to population:
it is the ratio of wealth to population. Quantity of wealth being given, the degree of
opulence is therefore not directly, but inversely, as the population, i.e. as the degree
of populousness—as the number of those who are to share in it: the fewer the shares,
the larger is each one’s share.
One passage in Pannomial Fragments supports a total-utilitarian interpretation. Bentham (1838–
1843, vol. 3, p. 228) argues that it is better to distribute wealth so that 10,000 already existing rich
people get richer than to use the money to give existence to some very poor people:
a greater addition to the aggregate quantity of happiness would be made by dividing
among the rst 10,000 the whole additional quantity of wealth, than by making any
addition to the number of persons brought into existence.
Here, Bentham uses money as a more easily measurable substitute for happiness, as he oen
did—see, for example, Bentham (1998, p. 252) and Schoeld (2006, p. 43). So far, the passage is
consistent with average utilitarianism, but Bentham (1838–1843, vol. 3, p. 228) continues:
For, supposing the whole 10,000 having each of them the minimum of the matter of
subsistence on any given day,—the next day, in consequence of some accident, they
might cease to have it, and in consequence cease to have existence: whereas, if of this
same 10,000, some had, in addition to his minimum of the matter of subsistence,
particles one or more of the matter of abundance, here would be a correspondent
mass of the matter of wealth, capable of being by the legislator so disposed of as
to be made to constitute the matter of subsistence to those who, otherwise being
without subsistence, would soon be without existence.
Hence it is because he holds that it is likely that the poor people who would live at the minimum of
subsistence would soon suer some accident and pass away, not because it would lower the average
level of happiness. This rationalization makes sense on the total view but not on the average view,
where the average would be lowered by the addition of the poor even if they managed to stay
alive.
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Bentham has any positive account of obligation.19 Bentham does, however,
present a stronger account of obligation in the penultimate chapter of An Intro-
duction:
(B34) Every act which promises to be benecial upon the whole to the
community (himself included) each individual ought to perform
of himself (Bentham, 1970, p. 285)
Hence it seems that Bentham holds that
(35) An act ought to be done if it conforms to the principle of utility.20
But, if (35) is what Bentham had in mind, why did he weaken his claim in (B2) by
adding the second disjunct in ‘one may always say either that it is one that ought
to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done’? One might
think that Bentham meant that some acts that conform to the principle of utility
are obligatory but other acts that conform are not obligatory and merely not
obligatory to avoid. But, if so, (B2) would not provide the more or less complete
meaning of ought, since we would also need to know which acts falls into the
rst category and which falls into the second. And that would conict with the
last sentence of (B2), which suggests that this paragraph provides the meaning of
ought. Instead, I think we should read the quote as saying that, if an act conforms
to the principle of utility, it would always be correct to say each of the following:
(i) the act ought to be done and (ii) it is not the case that the act ought not to
be done.21 The addition of (ii) makes clear, in combination with (i), that the act
conforming to the principle of utility will be obligatory in a non-dilemmatic
manner.
So we can safely conclude from (B34) that Bentham holds (35). Then, from
(30) and (35), we get that Bentham holds the following sucient criterion for
obligation:
(36) An act ought to be done if the sum total of the values of the pleasures it
appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is greater than the
sum total of the values of the pains it appears to produce and the pleasures
it appears to avert. [p. 101]
Moreover, an alternative path to get to the same interpretation is that (36) follows
from the combination of (18) and (33).22
19 Similarly, Bright (1991, p. 215) takes all these qualications to show that ‘Bentham did not
suppose there to be any very simple or direct connection between utility and obligation.’
20Here, I follow Kelly (1990, p. 258) in interpreting Bentham as not requiring any sanctions for
there being a moral obligation.
21 vonWright (1968, p. 21) points out that we ordinarily understand statements of the form ‘you
may work or relax’ as expressing its being permitted that you work and also its being permitted
that you relax.
22 Some commentators, such as Bright (1991, p. 229n12) and Shaver (2013, p. 295), think that
Bentham must have held a more complicated view because of his (1970, pp. 28–9nd) remarks in a
dialogue with an intuitionist about preventing a mischievous act, that it is one’s duty, ‘if it is what
lies in your power, and can be done without too great a sacrice, to endeavour to prevent it.’ Yet
this seems consistent with the simpler sum-total account: the qualication is necessary because if
the sacrice is large enough it will outweigh the mischief that would have been produced by the
prevented act. And then the prevented act would no longer be mischievous, and preventing it
would deviate from the principle of utility.
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6. The case of ties
So far, we have not considered what Bentham would say about cases where the
balance of pain and pleasure would be the same whether or not one does a
certain act. Consider
Case 3
Act Pleasures Pains
a 2 1
not-a 1 0
Read strictly, (B6) seems to say that an act’s being right requires that it conforms
to the principle of utility, and, likewise read strictly, (B1) seems to say that an act’s
conforming to the principle of utility requires that it augments happiness. We
get that act a in Case 3 is not right, since it does not aect the balance between
pain and pleasure. Similarly, in Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Bentham claims
that
(B37) An immoral sort of act, is that sort of act, the tendency of which is,
in some way or other, to lessen the quantity of happiness in society.
(Bentham, 1827, vol. 5, p. 303; 1838–1843, vol. 7, p. 474)
This suggests that he holds that acts are notwrong unless they diminish happiness.
So acts, such as a and not-a in Case 3, that neither augment nor diminish
happiness are, according to Bentham, neither right nor wrong, which is also
strongly suggested by (B3).23 This raises the puzzle of what Bentham takes to be
the deontic status of such acts. Earlier in Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Bentham
mentions, discussing moral intuitionism, a further deontic category beyond
right and wrong:
(B38) And if the tendency of an action to produce most pleasure or most
pain be the criterion and measure of its claim to be pronounced
right, indierent, or wrong, in any one case; in what other can it
fail of being so? (Bentham, 1827, vol. 1, p. 123; 1838–1843, vol. 6,
p. 239)
[p. 102]Hence it seems that acts that neither augment nor diminish happiness are
indierent rather than right or wrong.24 Combining this with (32), (33), and (36),
my binary interpretation of Bentham’s utilitarianism can be stated as follows:
23 As we noted earlier, this additional deontic category also seems to follow from the combina-
tion of (B13) and (B14). Moreover, the category seems required, in (B15), to allow for the possibility
of an act that is not commanded (i.e. neither right nor obligatory) and not prohibited (i.e. neither
wrong nor negatively obligatory).
24 This view that some acts are neither right nor wrong has been defended more recently by
Carlson (1995, p. 103). von Wright (1951, pp. 3–4) also treats ‘indierent’ as an deontic category
roughly corresponding to Bentham’s notion.
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The Binary Interpretation
(39) An act ought to be done if and only if the sum total of the values of the
pleasures it appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is greater
than the sum total of the values of the pains it appears to produce and the
pleasures it appears to avert.
(40) An act is right if and only if it ought to be done.
(41) An act is indierent if and only if the sum total of the values of the pleasures
it appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is equal to the sum
total of the values of the pains it appears to produce and the pleasures it
appears to avert.
(42) An act is wrong if and only if the sum total of the values of the pleasures it
appears to produce and the pains it appears to avert is less than the sum
total of the values of the pains it appears to produce and the pleasures it
appears to avert.
These criteria are binary, because they just compare what would happen if the
act were performed with what would happen if the act were not performed.
It might seem weird that acts ought to be done if and only if they are right,
but this ts with (B2), which explains both ought and right in terms of con-
formance to the principle of utility.25 Moreover, note that, in (B20), Bentham
regards it as logically true that ‘what is right ought to be done’. This conicts with
contemporary usage of these terms, but it accords with (40).
7.Maximizing ends
If we accept the binary interpretation of Bentham contained in (39)–(42), there
is still a major puzzle le relating to maximization. Slote (1984, pp. 153–4) claims
that a footnote which was added for the 1823 second edition of An Introduction,
defends ‘a typical optimizing form of (utilitarian) act-consequentialism’ in con-
ict with the mostly unaltered main text. This footnote states, regarding ‘the
principle of utility’, that
(B43) To this denomination has of late been added, or substituted, the
greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle: this for shortness,
instead of [p. 103] saying at length that principle which states the
greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being
the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally
desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation,
and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries
exercising the powers of Government.26 (Bentham, 1970, p. 11na)
25 See footnote 11. In Pannomial Fragments, Bentham (1838–1843, vol. 3, p. 218) claims that ‘You
have a right to perform whatever you are not under obligation to abstain from the performance
of.’ This might seem to conict with (40) and (41). Yet note that he is not claiming that an act
is right if it is not obligatory to abstain from it. Bentham tries to clarify here what is meant by
someone’s having a right.
26 Much the same footnote was also added to the second edition of A Fragment on Government;
see Bentham (1977, p. 446).
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While this is not a clear endorsement of Moorean maximization, it seems at least
clear that Bentham holds that
(44) The right and proper end for human action is the greatest happiness for
all whose interest is in question.27
This, however, is not a doctrinal departure from the account presented in the
rst edition. The nal chapter of the rst edition states that
(B45) Ethics at large may be dened, the art of directing men’s actions
to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness,
on the part of those whose interest is in view. (Bentham, 1789,
p. 308; 1970, p. 282)
The change announced in (B43) is not a revision of the principle of utility but
merely a new name for it. Bentham makes this clear in a letter to his translator,
Étienne Dumont, written some months aer (B43), stating:
(B46) Principle of Utility—is dead and gone. Greatest happiness principle
has succeeded to it: that is to say in English. (Bentham, 2000,
p. 149)
Thus there is little support, I think, for Slote’s suggestion that (B43) shows that
Bentham had changed his mind about maximization.28 Nonetheless, there is still
an apparent tension between the binary interpretation in (39)–(42) and the claim
in (44) that the right and proper end is the greatest happiness. While Bentham
does not state his explicit criteria for the rightness and wrongness of acts in
terms of ‘the greatest happiness’, he oen states that the greatest happiness is the
right and proper end.29 The talk about ‘the greatest happiness’ in (B43), (B45)
and other places raises the puzzle of how this can be squared with the binary
interpretation.30
In addition, there are several passages in which Bentham claims that his
theory requires one to produce the greatest happiness that could be produced in
a situation. In Constitutional Code Rationale, Bentham claims that [p. 104]
(B47) The greatest happiness of the greatest number of the members of
the community in question being the right and proper, and sole
right and proper, end of government, misrule has place in so far as
by the line of conduct pursued by the rulers positive unhappiness
is produced, or any quantity of happiness that by a dierent line of
conductmight have been produced by them fails of being produced.
(Bentham, 1989, p. 270)
Here, it seems clear that, when one assesses a feasible line of conduct, every
alternative line of conduct that might be pursued instead is relevant.
27 See also Bentham (1952–1954, vol. 3, p. 318; 1993, p. 5).
28 Furthermore, Bentham (1977, p. 393) used the maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of
the greatest number’ as early as 1776 in the preface to A Fragment on Government.
29 Postema (2002, p. xv) and Shaver (2013, p. 294).
30 Bentham’s maximizing passages in this section are, of course, especially problematic for the
satiscing interpretation.
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Another example comes from Bentham’s essay ‘On Retrenchment’, where
he compares the principle of utility—then known as the greatest-happiness
principle—with a misunderstanding based on the principle’s earlier locution ‘the
greatest happiness of the greatest number’:31
(B48) Bring to view in supposition two communities. Number of the
individuals—in the one, 1,000: in the other, 1,001: of both together,
2,001. By the greatest happiness, the arrangement prescribed would
be that by which the greatest happiness of all together would be
produced. But wide indeed from this eect might be the eect of
the application of the principle, if the arrangement productive of
the greatest happiness of the greatest number—no regard being
shewn to the happiness of the smaller number—were understood
to be the arrangement prescribed by that same principle.
So long as the greatest number—the 1,001—were in the enjoy-
ment of the greatest degree of comfort, the greatest possible degree
of torment might be the lot of the smallest of the two numbers—
the 1,000: and still the principle stating as the proper object of
endeavour the greatest happiness of the greatest number be actu-
ally conformed to—not contravened.32 (Bentham, 1993, p. 352)
[p. 105]Here, Bentham seems to consider a case where we have a choice between
several distinct arrangements for the two communities, and, from all of these
arrangements, the principle of utility prescribes the arrangement ‘by which the
greatest happiness of all together would be produced’. Hence, to nd out whether
an act is right, it seems that one has to consider what would happen for each of
the available options, not just for the act and for the corresponding negative act.
A nal example comes from Codication Proposal, where Bentham provides
the following rough version of his theory:
31 Bentham (1970, p. 11) announced ‘the greatest happiness’ label in (B43).
32 See also Bentham (1983, pp. 309–10). It should be clear from (B48) that Bentham does not
defend the following view, which Bykvist (2010, p. 20) ascribes to him:
Total happiness is not the only important thing; it also matters how many people are
beneted. In a choice between two outcomes that contain the same amount of total
happiness, we should realize the one in which more people are beneted.
There is, I think, a more plausible reading of the ‘greatest number’ part of ‘the greatest happiness of
the greatest number’ slogan. Unlike on other moral views that were popular when Leibniz (1700,
p. 378) introduced the slogan, utilitarianism takes the happiness of everyone into account, not
just the happiness of a smaller set of people such as just oneself or the ruling class. The ‘greatest
number’ part stresses that as many people as possible—that is, everybody—should be included
when one calculates the sum total of happiness. This reading is especially plausible, I think, for
Leibniz’s (1700, p. 378) original formulation of the slogan, translated in Hruschka (1991, p. 166):
to act in accordance with supreme reason is to act in such a manner that the greatest
quantity of good available is obtained for the greatest multitude possible and that as
much felicity is diused as the reason of things can bear.
In other words, one should, taking the greatest multitude of people into account, maximize their
collective sum total of happiness. Given this reading, the slogan is not open to the oen repeated
charge, put forward by Edgeworth (1881, p. 117–8) and vonNeumann andMorgenstern (1944, p. 11),
that it self-contradictorily recommends maximizing two independent functions. But, if—as I have
suggested—the maximization of number is within the scope of the maximization of happiness,
the principle is no more self-contradicting than, for example, maximin. Crimmins (2011, p. 61)
asks ‘Why did Bentham not twig to this defect in the utilitarian formula earlier?’ If I am right,
however, the formula’s content was not defective; the problem was just its presentation.
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(B49) Good is pleasure or exemption from pain: or a cause or instrument
of either, considered in so far as it is a cause or instrument of either.
Evil is pain or loss of pleasure; or a cause or instrument of
either; considered in so far as it is a cause or instrument of either.
Happiness is the sum of pleasures, deductionmade or notmade
of the sum of pains. (Bentham, 1998, p. 256)
(B50) To warrant the employment of evil, whether in the character of
punishment or in any other character, two points require to be
made out: 1. that, by means of it, good to a preponderant amount
will be produced: 2. that, at any less expense of evil, good in so great
proportion can not be produced. (Bentham, 1998, p. 256)
The second point at the end of (B50) suggests that Bentham holds that whether
an act that employs some evil should be done depends on more than just the
course of action one would take were one to employ some evil and the course
one would take were one to not employ it.
Thus, as we have seen in this section, there are a lot of passages where
Bentham seems to accept a maximizing form of utilitarianism which requires
one to produce the greatest happiness among all feasible options. In the next
section, we shall explore how the maximizing described in these passages can
be squared with the binary interpretation.
8. The role of negative and complex acts in Bentham’s maximizing
The key to understanding the relation between Bentham’s criteria for right and
wrong in (39)–(42) and the end of realizing the greatest happiness in [p. 106]
(44) is his theory of action, which includes negative and complex acts. We begin
with negative acts, which as we saw in (B17) consists in forbearing to do a certain
act—that is, if a is an act, then forbearing to do a is doing the negative act not-a.
Consider the following case where one has a choice between three acts, which
are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive:
Case 4
Act Pleasures Pains
a 3 0
b 2 0
c 1 0
If one performs one of the acts b and c, one will perform the negative act not-a.
And, regardless of how one does not-a (that is, regardless of which one of b and
c is performed), doing a instead would have had a better balance of pleasure.
Hence doing not-a is wrong according to (42). The only way to avoid doing
something wrong according to (42) is to pursue the line of conduct that produces
the greatest happiness.
Case 4 also illustrates a peculiar feature of binary utilitarianism. The outcome
of a negative act such as not-b depends, if there are more than two courses of
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action, on how not-b is done.33 Suppose we wonder whether b is right or wrong.
If a were performed, then not-b would produce the same amount of pain and
pleasure as a so b would be wrong, because b would produce less happiness than
not-b would. On the other hand, if c were performed then not-b would produce
the same amount of pain and pleasure as c so b would be right, because b would
produce more happiness than not-b would. This phenomenon—that the deontic
status of an act in a situation depends on what one does in the situation—is
called normative variance. The most common objection to normative variance
is that it leads to problems with action-guidance.34 Bentham is not open to this
objection because one only needs to know that the act that produces the greatest
possible happiness in the situation (in Case 4, for example, act a) is guaranteed
to not be wrong.
This also illustrates how binary maximization diers fromMoorean max-
imization. These two forms of maximization are similar in that the only way
to avoid doing anything wrong is to perform the act with the greatest possible
happiness in the situation. The two forms dier, however, in how they handle
non-optimal courses of action. On Moorean maximization, b is wrong in Case 4
regardless of what acts are performed in the situation. But, on binary maximiza-
tion, as we have just seen, b would be right if c were performed. [p. 107]
If there are two or more optimal acts, things get slightly more complicated.
Consider the following case:
Case 5
Act Pleasures Pains
a 3 0
b 3 0
c 2 0
d 1 0
If one would perform b if one were to perform not-a and one would perform
a if one were to perform not-a, then neither a nor b would be obligatory; they
would both be indierent since a, not-a, b, and not-b would all produce the
same amount of pain and pleasure.
To handle this case, we need to take into account not just negative acts
but also complex acts. In An Introduction, Bentham describes complex acts as
follows:
(B51) acts may be distinguished into simple and complex: simple, such
as the act of striking, the act of leaning, or the act of drinking
[. . .]: complex, consisting each of a multitude of simple acts, which,
though numerous and heterogeneous, derive a sort of unity from
the relation they bear to some common design or end; such as the
act of giving a dinner, the act of maintaining a child, the act of
33 One might object that, if Bentham thought of negative acts in this way, one would expect
him to talk about dierent instances of a single negative act; but he does not. Yet this absence can
be explained by the general scarcity of discussions of situations with more than two alternatives
in Bentham’s writings.
34 See, for example, Carlson (1995, pp. 100–1).
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exhibiting a triumph, the act of bearing arms, the act of holding a
court, and so fourth. (Bentham, 1970, pp. 78–9)
Consider the complex act that consists in the negative acts not-c and not-d, that
is, (not-c)-and-(not-d). The simple parts of this complex act derive a unity by
their common end, that is, the only right and proper end, the greatest happiness.
If one were to perform neither of the optimal acts a and b, one would perform
one of c and d, that is, one would perform the disjunctive act c-or-d or, put
in more verbose terms of negative and complex acts, one would perform not-
((not-c)-and-(not-d)), that is, the negative act that consists in not performing
the complex act (not-c)-and-(not-d). Yet performing not-((not-c)-and-(not-d))
would be wrong according to (42).35 So, again, we have that in order to not do
something wrong according to (42), one has to do an act that will realize the
right and proper end of the greatest happiness for the concerned individuals.
In thismanner, we can show that, in any situation, the onlyway to avoid doing
a wrong act according to Bentham’s binary utilitarianism is to do the act that
produces the greatest happiness out of all feasible acts in the [p. 108] situation.
Hence, unlike rival interpretations, the binary interpretation renders Bentham
consistent. On the binary interpretation, we canmake sense of Bentham’s felicic
calculus, his criterion of right and wrong, and his talk of maximization in his
slogans and elsewhere. Hence there is, I think, a convincing case that Bentham
was a binary act utilitarian.
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